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FOREIGN PRECEDENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION BY THE SUPREME COURT OF
SINGAPORE, 1963–2013
Jack Tsen-Ta Lee †
Abstract: This article surveys the use of foreign precedents in constitutional
adjudication by the Supreme Court of Singapore for over half of a century during the
terms of the first three Chief Justices—Wee Chong Jin (1963–1990), Yong Pung How
(1990–2006), and Chan Sek Keong (2006–2012)—and the first year in office of the
fourth Chief Justice, Sundaresh Menon (2012–2013). It concludes that while judges have
always cited foreign case law, they have only actually applied foreign cases where the
wording of the Constitution and the constitutional arrangements in Singapore are fairly
analogous to the constitutional texts and arrangements upon which the cases were
decided. Sometimes, Singapore judges quoted passages from cases in an instrumental
manner to support statements of law without necessarily analyzing in detail the reasoning
underlying such cases. There were also instances where foreign jurisprudence was
rejected on the basis that it related to constitutional texts that were worded differently
from the Constitution. In recent times the courts have been more willing to examine why
foreign courts arrived at certain results, but this has not necessarily led them to adopt the
same conclusions that those courts reached. It is likely that the courts’ choice of which
foreign precedents are followed or rejected will depend on whether they remain
deferential to the policy choices of the political branches of government, or develop
constitutional principles to subject these choices to greater scrutiny.

On November 6, 2012, Sundaresh Menon became the fourth Chief
Justice of Singapore since the nation gained independence from the United
Kingdom in 1963 and became a state of the Federation of Malaysia.
Although Singapore was to leave Malaysia two years later in 1965 to
become a wholly independent republic, 1963 remains significant as the year
in which the fundamental liberties guaranteed by the Malaysian Constitution
were extended to Singapore. For the first time, it became possible for the
courts to strike down executive action and legislation inconsistent with these
rights, a power they continue to possess today. As 2013 marked the 50th
anniversary of these momentous events, it is apposite to assess how the
Supreme Court has carried out constitutional adjudication during the terms
of the first three Chief Justices—Wee Chong Jin (January 5, 1963 –
September 27, 1990), Yong Pung How (September 28, 1990 – April 10,
†
Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management University. My thanks are
due to Marie-Claire Ponthoreau and Tania Groppi for reviewing an earlier version of the article for the XIX
International Congress of Constitutional Law in Vienna, Austria, July 20-26, 2014; to my research
assistants Teo Xuan Lang and Wong Joon Wee for their hard work; and to the University for providing a
research grant (13-C234-SMU-007) to support the writing of this article.
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2006) and Chan Sek Keong (April 11, 2006 – November 5, 2012)—and the
first year in office of Sundaresh Menon.
Specifically, this article examines how the courts have engaged with
foreign jurisprudence—that is, judgments from courts of other jurisdictions
and international courts such as the European Court of Human Rights. It
approaches the question by first explaining the framework for constitutional
adjudication in Singapore, then by reviewing the use of foreign precedents in
such adjudication. Finally, it offers some conclusions on the role that
foreign precedents have played. The aim is to try and gauge whether the
Singapore courts are engaged in a transjudicial dialogue—i.e. when
“performing their adjudicatory functions [and] find[ing] inspiration in
foreign case law, [whether they are] engaging in a conversation with other
judges worldwide.”1
I.

THE FRAMEWORK FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

In order to appreciate the Singapore courts’ role in interpreting and
applying the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore,2 the framework for
constitutional adjudication is briefly described here. Following World War
II, Singapore was a Crown colony and then a self-governing state of the
United Kingdom.3 Singapore then left the British Empire by becoming a
state of the Federation of Malaysia on September 16, 1963. It was also
during this time that a bill of rights—Part II of the Malaysian Federal
Constitution, entitled “Fundamental Liberties”4—first became applicable to
Singapore. The Constitution of the State of Singapore5 (the “1963 State
Constitution”) itself lacked such a recitation of rights. However, merger
with Malaysia was short-lived, and Singapore became an independent
republic on August 9, 1965. The Parliament of Singapore cobbled together a
constitution from the 1963 State Constitution, certain provisions of the
Malaysian Constitution (which were made applicable by the Republic of
1
Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau, Introduction: The Methodology of the Research: How
to Assess the Reality of Transjudicial Communication?, in THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY
CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES 1, 1 (Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds., 2013).
2
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint).
3
As a Crown colony from 1955 onwards, a Governor headed Singapore, and its Legislative Council
consisted of members both appointed by the United Kingdom government and elected by the people. After
becoming a self-governing state in 1959, Singapore gained a wholly elected Legislative Assembly led by a
Prime Minister and his Cabinet. C[ONSTANCE] M[ARY] TURNBULL, A HISTORY OF MODERN SINGAPORE
1819–2005 244-45, 268-69 (2009).
4
Federal Constitution (Malay.).
5
Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore (State Constitutions) Order in Council, 1963, S.I. 1963/1493 (U.K.)
(containing the Constitution of the State of Singapore (1963)).
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Singapore Independence Act 1965), 6 and the latter Act itself. 7 The
fundamental liberties clauses were among the provisions imported from
Malaysia at this time.8
Two provisions of the 1963 State Constitution that became part of the
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore9 merit particular mention. Article
52 of the 1963 State Constitution, which was reworded and renumbered as
Article 4 of the present Constitution, states: “This Constitution is the
supreme law of the Republic of Singapore and any law enacted by the
Legislature after the commencement of this Constitution which is
inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency,
be void.”10 Article 105(1) of the 1963 State Constitution is now Article 162
of the present Constitution, and reads as follows:
Subject to this Article, all existing laws shall continue in force
on and after the commencement of this Constitution and all
laws which have not been brought into force by the date of the
commencement of this Constitution may, subject as aforesaid,
be brought into force on or after its commencement, but all
such laws shall, subject to this Article, be construed as from the
commencement of this Constitution with such modifications,
adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary
to bring them into conformity with this Constitution.11
Together, these provisions emphasize the supremacy of the
Constitution over ordinary legislation inconsistent with it. Article 162
makes laws that existed before August 9, 196512 continue in force after
Singapore’s independence, but requires them to conform with the
6
Republic of Singapore Independence Act (Act 9 of 1965) s 6(1) [hereinafter RISA]. The RISA
was passed on Dec. 22, 1965, and made retrospective to August 9, 1965.
7
Kevin Tan Yew Lee, The Evolution of Singapore’s Modern Constitution: Developments from
1945 to the Present Day, 1 SING. ACAD. L. J. 1, 17 (1989). The RSIA appears in form to be an ordinary
statute enacted by Parliament, but the High Court regarded it as part of the Singapore Constitution.
Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 698 at [111].
8
Note that the RSIA omitted the right to property guaranteed by Article 13 of the Malaysian
Constitution. Republic of Singapore Independence Act (Act 9 of 1965) s 6(3). This was to ensure the
constitutionality of the Land Acquisition Act (Cap 152, 1985 Rev Ed), which would be enacted the
following year. See Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 December 1965) vol 24 at cols
435-36 (Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister). At the time, the Act empowered the Government to compulsorily
acquire private land for public purposes without providing persons interested in the land with compensation
at the prevailing market rate. Compensation was adjusted to the market rate in 2007. See Bryan Chew et
al., Compulsory Acquisition of Land in Singapore: A Fair Regime?, 22 SING. ACAD. L. J. 166, 167 (2010).
9
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint).
10
Id. at Art 4.
11
Id. at Art 162.
12
Id. at Art 2(1) (definition of the word “commencement”).
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Constitution by being “construed . . . with such modifications, adaptations,
qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary.” Article 4 states that
laws enacted after August 9, 1965 that are inconsistent with the Constitution
are void. Read in the light of Article 162, this appears to suggest that laws
enacted before that date are not wholly invalid but need only be construed in
line with the Constitution. However, in Tan Eng Hong v. Public
Prosecutor,13 the Court of Appeal, Singapore’s highest court, held that, on a
purposive interpretation of Articles 4 and 162, legislation enacted before
August 9, 1965 that infringes upon the Constitution is also of no effect.14
The Constitution does not specify which organ of state is generally
responsible for determining the constitutionality of executive action or
legislation. Soon after the Federation of Malaya gained its independence
from the British in 1957, the power to do so was implicitly asserted by its
courts.15 This exercise of judicial review continued when Singapore joined
the Federation in 1963 and subsequently achieved full independence in
1965. 16 In 2011, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that, because the
Constitution vests judicial power in the Supreme Court,17 it has “jurisdiction
to adjudicate on every legal dispute on a subject matter in respect of which
Parliament has conferred jurisdiction on it, including any constitutional
dispute between the State and an individual.”18 This conclusion makes it
13

Tan Eng Hong v. Public Prosecutor [2012] 4 SLR 476 (CA) (Sing.).
Id. at [506].
15
Chia Khin Sze v. The Mentri Besar, State of Selangor [1958] 1 M.L.J. 105 (Malay.) (addressing
whether the right to counsel guaranteed by Article 5(3) of the Constitution applies to inquiries held
pursuant to the Restricted Residence Enactment of 1933, Act 377 (Federated Malay. States)); B. Surinder
Singh Kanda v. The Government of the Federation of Malaya [1962] 1 M.L.J. 169, 322 (P.C.) (appeal taken
from Malay.) (issue of whether appellant’s dismissal from the police force by the Commissioner of Police
was invalid because it was not effected by the Police Service Commission depended on whether provisions
of the Police Ordinance 1952, Ordinance 14 (Federation of Malaya), were inconsistent with Articles 135(1)
and 144(1) of the Constitution). See also S. Jayakumar, Constitutional Limitations on Legislative Power in
Malaysia, 4(1) MALAYA L. REV. 96, 97 (1967) (“The ‘supremacy’ of the Constitution is effected by giving
the Courts the power to review governmental actions which violate these limits.”).
16
See, e.g., Osman v. Public Prosecutor [1968–1970] SLR(R) 117 at [16-24] (PC) (appeal taken
from Sing.) (The Privy Council, then Singapore’s final appellate court, was called upon to assess the
constitutionality of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act of 1964 (Malay.).).
17
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 93 (“The judicial
power of Singapore shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such subordinate courts as may be provided
by any written law for the time being in force.”).
18
Yong Vui Kong v. Attorney-General [2011] 2 SLR 1189 at [31] (CA) (Sing.) [hereinafter Yong Vui
Kong v. A.G.]. See also Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209 at [50] (Sing.)
(“The court has the power and duty to ensure that the provisions of the Constitution are observed. The
court also has a duty to declare invalid any exercise of power, legislative and executive, which exceeds the
limits of the power conferred by the Constitution, or which contravenes any prohibition which the
Constitution provides.”); Public Prosecutor v. Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 410 at [89] (CA) (Sing.)
(“The courts, in upholding the rule of law in Singapore, will no doubt readily invalidate laws that derogate
from the Constitution which is the supreme law of our land.”); Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v. Public
Prosecutor [2012] 4 SLR 947 at [14] (CA) (Sing.) (The nation’s Westminster-model legal system “is based
14
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clear that the duty of securing observance of the Constitution by the political
branches of government falls upon the courts as an aspect of judicial power,
and is analogous to rulings in other jurisdictions such as the seminal
judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison.19
Until April 8, 1994, 20 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
based in the United Kingdom was Singapore’s final appellate court21 and the
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. Today, primary responsibility for
interpreting and enforcing the Constitution lies with the Supreme Court,
which has two divisions: the Court of Appeal, which is Singapore’s final
appellate court; and the High Court, which exercises original jurisdiction in
weighty matters.22 The High Court has suggested that “[w]here questions of
law have already been decided or principles relating to an article in the
Constitution have been set out by the superior courts, a subordinate court . . .
should proceed to apply the relevant case law or extrapolate from the
principles enunciated to reach a proper conclusion on the facts before it.”23
Thus, the State Courts—the lower courts in Singapore—are confined to
issuing declarations as to constitutionality; 24 they possess no power to
exercise supervisory jurisdiction over tribunals or public authorities,
judicially review the acts or decisions of any persons or authorities, or issue
prerogative orders.25 Only the High Court may do so.26 As in the United
Kingdom, constitutional issues are dealt with by the ordinary hierarchy of
on the supremacy of the Singapore Constitution, with the result that the Singapore courts may declare an
Act of the Singapore parliament invalid for inconsistency with the Singapore Constitution and, hence, null
and void.”).
19
5 U.S. 137, 176-78 (1803).
20
Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment) Act (Act 16 of 1993) (Sing.); Constitution of the
Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act (Act 17 of 1993) (Sing.); Judicial Committee (Repeal) Act (Act 2
of 1994) (Sing.). Appeals to the Privy Council had been restricted from 1989. Appeals were only possible
in civil cases if all the parties to the proceedings consented, and in criminal matters where the death penalty
had been imposed but the Court of Criminal Appeal’s decision had not been unanimous. Judicial
Committee (Amendment) Act (Act 21 of 1989) (Sing.).
21
Judicial Committee Act (Act 37 of 1966) (Sing.); Constitution (Amendment) Act (Act 19 of 1969)
(Sing.).
22
The High Court’s original jurisdiction is unlimited, but if a party commences an action in the High
Court without a proper reason and only succeeds in recovering a sum which could have been sued for in a
Subordinate Court, he or she will only be awarded costs on the State Courts scale. State Courts Act (Cap
321, 2007 Rev Ed) s 39.
23
Johari bin Kanadi v. Public Prosecutor [2008] 3 SLR(R) 422 at [9] (Sing.).
24
State Courts Act (Cap 321, 2007 Rev Ed) s 31(2)(b) (Dist. Cts.) and s 52(1B)(b)(ii) (Magis. Cts.).
25
Id. at s 19(3)(a)–(b) (Dist. Cts.) and s 52(2) (Magis. Cts.). The prerogative orders are the
mandatory order (formerly known as “mandamus”), prohibiting order (“prohibition”), quashing order
(“certiorari”), and order for review of detention (“habeas corpus”). Id. at s 19(3)(b).
26
Regarding the High Court’s inherent supervisory jurisdiction, see Ng Chye Huey v. Public
Prosecutor [2007] 2 SLR(R) 106 at [49, 53] (CA) (Sing.); regarding its power to issue prerogative orders,
see the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 18(2).
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courts, which also deal with private law matters, rather than by a specialized
constitutional court.27
The independence of the Supreme Court judges to exercise judicial
power, including constitutional judicial review, is generally safeguarded by
provisions in Part VIII of the Constitution.28 These include prohibitions
against the offices of judges being abolished,29 as well as their remuneration
and other terms of office being altered to their disadvantage after
appointment;30 tenure until the age of 65 years;31 a stringent process for
removing a judge from his or her office;32 and requiring no less than a
quarter of the total number of Members of Parliament to give notice of a
substantive motion before a judge’s conduct can be discussed in
Parliament.33
The foregoing description shows that Singapore’s legal system has
features similar to those of many common law jurisdictions. Notably, it
possesses a written constitution containing a bill of rights, and its courts
have asserted a duty to strike down ordinary legislation that infringes upon
the Constitution. Since some of these other jurisdictions routinely refer to
foreign precedents when engaging in constitutional adjudication, it is
interesting to assess the extent to which the Singapore courts do so as well.
I.

FOREIGN PRECEDENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

A.

Methodology

To examine the role of foreign precedents in constitutional
adjudication in Singapore, reported and unreported constitutional cases
decided between September 16, 1963 and December 31, 2013 that were
27
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 100(1) provides that
the President may refer to a tribunal of not less than three Supreme Court judges for its opinion on “any
question as to the effect of any provision of this Constitution which has arisen or appears to him likely to
arise.” However, the President’s discretion to refer such matters must be exercised in accordance with the
advice of the Cabinet or a minister acting under the Cabinet’s general authority. Id. Art 21(1). In this
respect, the President has no power to exercise personal discretion or act against the Cabinet’s advice. Cf.
Yong Vui Kong v. A.G. [2011] 2 SLR 1189 at [157, 180] (CA) (Sing.). Thus, persons may not have
constitutional questions referred by the President to the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore Tribunal
as a matter of right.
28
See generally Michael Hor, The Independence of the Criminal Justice System in Singapore, 2002
SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 497; Chan Sek Keong, Securing and Maintaining Judicial Independence, 22 SING.
ACAD. L.J. 229 (2010).
29
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 95(3).
30
Id. at Art 98(8).
31
Id. at Art 98(1).
32
Id. at Art 98(2)–(5).
33
Id. at Art 99.
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available on LawNet, a subscription-based online database, were
examined.34 These included judgments of the Privy Council hearing appeals
from Singapore, as well as judgments of the upper and lower divisions of the
Supreme Court of Singapore—the Court of Appeal and the High Court.35
These judgments were reported in various series of law reports, which are
described below.
Between 1963 and 1991, selected judgments of the Privy Council, the
Court of Appeal and the High Court were reported in the Malaya Law
Journal (“M.L.J.”).36 From 1992, this task was assumed by the Singapore
Law Reports (“S.L.R.”), which were published by Butterworths Asia on the
authority of the Singapore Academy of Law (“S.A.L.”). In 1996,
Butterworths reproduced Singapore judgments that had appeared in the
M.L.J. between 1965 and 1991 in a series of S.L.R. volumes. Having
formed a Council of Law Reporting, the Academy took over responsibility
for publishing the law reports in 2003, and in 2010, reissued the 1965–2010
judgments that had appeared in the S.L.R. in a series called the Singapore
Law Reports (Reissue) (“S.L.R.(R.)”).37 As the courts require judgments in
the S.L.R.(R.) to be cited in preference to those in the S.L.R.,38 judgments
published in the S.L.R.(R.) from August 9, 1965 to December 31, 2010,
which are available on LawNet, were used. Judgments in the M.L.J. were
consulted for the period of September 16, 1963 to August 8, 1965, and those
in the S.L.R. for the period of January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2013.
LawNet also contains unreported judgments, but only has a consistent set of
these starting from the 2000s. Earlier judgments are archived by the
Registry of the Supreme Court, but as these have not been digitized and
34
LawNet, which is managed by the Singapore Academy of Law, contains, among other things,
reported and unreported judgments of the Supreme Court and State Courts, judgments from courts of other
countries such as Malaysia and the United Kingdom, journal articles, and textbooks. LAWNET,
www.lawnet.com.sg (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).
35
From colonial times until 1993, Singapore had a separate Court of Appeal (which dealt with civil
appeals) and Court of Criminal Appeal. The system of having two appellate courts was confirmed after
Singapore’s independence by the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Act 24 of 1969), and was eventually
replaced by the present unitary Court of Appeal through the enactment of the Supreme Court of Judicature
(Amendment) Act (Act 16 of 1993) and the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act
(Act 17 of 1993). See Kevin Tan Yew Lee, A Short Legal and Constitutional History of Singapore, in THE
SINGAPORE LEGAL SYSTEM 26, 40, 51–52 (Kevin Y[ew] L[ee] Tan ed., 2d ed. 1999 (2003 reprint)). In this
article, in regard to the period prior to when the unitary Court of Appeal was established, the term “Court of
Appeal” refers to the Court of Criminal Appeal as well.
36
In fact, the Malayan Law Journal published cases originating from Singapore beginning in 1932.
See G. W. Bartholomew & Kevin Y[ew] L[ee] Tan, A History of Law Reporting, in ESSAYS IN SINGAPORE
LEGAL HISTORY 139, 152 (Kevin Y[ew] L[ee] Tan ed., 2005).
37
Id. at 154-56; Law Reporting, SINGAPORE ACADEMY OF LAW, http://www.sal.org.sg/content/LK_
law_reporting.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
38
Supreme Court Practice Directions, para. 74(6), https://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/data/doc/
ManagePage/98/ePD_WebHelp/ePD.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).
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uploaded to LawNet, there is presently no convenient way to access or
assess them. Thus, such judgments were not considered for this article.
Cases were regarded as ‘constitutional’ if they involved the
application of provisions of the Constitution. In each judgment, the number
of foreign precedents cited by judges in the course of constitutional
adjudication was counted, except for foreign precedents mentioned in
quotations which were disregarded. A court was treated as having engaged
in constitutional adjudication if it considered the meaning of a constitutional
provision, applied such a provision to a factual scenario, or dealt with
procedural issues relevant to constitutional law, such as standing (locus
standi) or remedies. By the same token, foreign precedents cited in portions
of judgments concerning other matters (for example, issues of criminal law
or private law) were ignored. Finally, given space constraints, only cases
regarded as particularly illustrative of the courts’ trends in referring to
foreign precedents were selected for discussion in this article.
B.

Findings

1.

Number of Constitutional Judgments

Using the methodology described above, the study found 153 cases
between 1963 and 2013 that qualified as ‘constitutional cases’ for this
analysis, averaging 3.06 cases each year. 39 This is a small number
considering that during the nine-year period between 2000 and 2008, the
High Court of Australia decided 193 constitutional cases (21.44 cases per
year),40 and in the 29 years between 1982 and 2010, the Supreme Court of
Canada determined 949 of such cases (32.72 cases per year).41 Undoubtedly,
the fact that Singapore’s population—5,399,200 as of June 201342—is much
smaller than that of Australia and Canada has an impact on the number of
cases brought before its courts. However, population does not appear to be
strictly determinative of constitutional litigation rates. In Ireland, which has
39

To calculate this figure, the number of 153 constitutional cases was divided by 50 years. However,
to be precise, the period from September 16, 1963 to December 31, 2013 is 50 years, 3 months, and 15 days.
40
Cheryl Saunders & Adrienne Stone, Reference to Foreign Precedents by the Australian High
Court: A Matter of Method, in THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES 23 (Tania
Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds., 2013)
41
Gianluca Gentili, Canada: Protecting Rights in a ‘Worldwide Rights Culture’: An Empirical Study
of the Use of Foreign Precedents by the Supreme Court of Canada (1982–2010), in THE USE OF FOREIGN
PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES 53, table 1 (Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds.,
2013).
42
NATIONAL POPULATION AND TALENT DIVISION, PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE ET AL., POPULATION IN
BRIEF 2013 4-5 (2013), available at www.nptd.gov.sg/portals/0/news/population-in-brief-2013.pdf.
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an estimated population of 4,593,100 as of April 2013,43 the Supreme Court
decided 902 constitutional cases over the 74-year period between 1937 and
2010 (12.19 cases per year).44 At this point, we can only speculate about the
reasons for the low number of constitutional cases in Singapore. It may be
that Singaporeans are generally less litigious than nationals of other
countries, and that they are particularly reluctant to take legal action against
public authorities for fear that doing so will trigger some form of backlash in
future dealings with the authorities.
The low success rate of constitutional claims may also be a factor. In
the 50 years since 1963, there have only been three cases in which the courts
held that the government’s interpretation of constitutional provisions was
incorrect. The 1988 case of Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs45
concerned whether certain provisions in the Internal Security Act (“ISA”)46
should be interpreted as conferring on the Minister a subjective or objective
discretion. The Act empowers the Minister for Home Affairs to detain
without trial persons believed to pose a national security risk, and to suspend
and revoke the suspension of such detention orders. The Court of Appeal
held that construing the Minister’s discretion as subjective would, among
other things, violate the guarantee of equal protection in Article 12(1) of the
Constitution,47 and the vesting of judicial power in the courts by Article 93.48
However, the remarks were obiter dicta, and Parliament swiftly neutralized
any potential legal effect by means of amendments to the Constitution and
the ISA, which came into effect less than two months after the judgment was
handed down.49 About a decade later in 1998, the High Court ruled in Taw
Cheng Kong v. Public Prosecutor50 that one of the sections of the Prevention
of Corruption Act51 infringed Article 12(1). This decision was overturned
by the Court of Appeal.52 Most recently, in 2013, the Court of Appeal
43

Population
and
Migration
Estimates:
April
2013,
CENTRAL
STATISTICS
OFFICE, http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/pme/populationandmigrationestimatesapril2013/ (l
ast visited Mar. 7, 2015).
44
Cristina Fasone, The Supreme Court of Ireland and the Use of Foreign Precedents: The Value of
Constitutional History, in THE USE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES 116 (Tania
Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds., 2013).
45
Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 (CA) (Sing.).
46
Internal Security Act (Cap 143, 1985 Rev Ed).
47
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 12(1) (“All persons
are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.”).
48
Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 at [79-82] (CA) (Sing.).
49
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act (Act 1 of 1989); Internal Security
(Amendment) Act (Act 2 of 1989).
50
Taw Cheng Kong v. Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 78 (Sing.).
51
Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap. 241, 1993 Rev. Ed.).
52
Public Prosecutor v. Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 489 (CA) (Sing.).
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determined in Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General 53 that the
Government’s interpretation of Article 49(1) of the Constitution was
incorrect. This provision reads as follows:
Whenever the seat of a Member, not being a non-constituency
Member, has become vacant for any reason other than a
dissolution of Parliament, the vacancy shall be filled by election
in the manner provided by or under any law relating to
Parliamentary elections for the time being in force.54
The Government asserted that the provision conferred upon it the
discretion to decide that a by-election need not be held to fill a casual
vacancy that arises in Parliament, and that it is permissible to leave the seat
vacant until the next general election. While the High Court agreed with this
interpretation,55 the Court of Appeal did not.56 Ultimately, though, its view
on the matter was obiter, as it also found that the appellant lacked standing
by the time the appeal was heard—the by-election in question had already
been called and concluded.57
Nevertheless, as Figure 1 below shows, there appears to be a broad
trend towards more constitutional cases being brought. The increase began
in 1987 when six judgments were rendered; before that, there were no more
than four judgments a year. Since then, the number of constitutional
judgments has fluctuated. There have been periods such as 1991–1995,
1999–2004, and 2007–2010 (except 2008) when the number of judgments
has fallen—in fact, no judgments were rendered in 1993 and 2002.
However, in between those fallow periods the number of judgments
rebounded, reaching highs in 2006 (nine judgments) and 2012 (13
judgments).

53
54
55
56
57

Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1 (CA) (Sing.).
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 49(1).
Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 698 (Sing.).
Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1 at [54-82] (CA) (Sing.).
See id. at [11-44].
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Figure 1: Number of Constitutional Cases Decided 1963–2013
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It is hard to be definitive about the reasons for the trend. There does
not appear to be any common thread linking the six judgments decided in
1987. However, five of the judgments issued between 1988 and 1990 relate
to habeas corpus applications challenging the legality of detentions under the
ISA resulting from Operation Spectrum.58 This was a security operation
launched by the Internal Security Department of the Ministry of Home
Affairs in 1987 against persons said to have been acting “in a manner
prejudicial to the security of Singapore by being involved in a Marxist
conspiracy to subvert the existing social and political system in Singapore,
using communist united front tactics, with a view to establishing a Marxist
state.”59 Such allegations were rejected by the detainees.60 Similarly, a
number of the judgments issued between 1996 and 1998 result from action
having been taken against Jehovah’s Witnesses for membership in an
unlawful society,61 possession of unlawful publications,62 and refusing to
58

De Souza Kevin Desmond and others v. Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 1 SLR(R) 464 (Sing.);
Teo Soh Lung v. Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 30 (Sing.); Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for
Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 (Sing.); Teo Soh Lung v. Minister for Home Affairs [1989] 1 SLR(R)
461 (Sing.); Teo Soh Lung v. Minister for Home Affairs [1990] 1 SLR(R) 347 (CA) (Sing.); Cheng Vincent
v. Minister for Home Affairs [1990] 1 SLR(R) 38 (Sing.).
59
Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 at [4] (Sing.).
60
On the legal aspects of Operation Spectrum generally, see Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, Shall the Twain
Never Meet? Competing Narratives and Discourses of the Rule of Law in Singapore, 2012 SING. J. LEGAL
STUD. 298, 307-13.
61
Chan Cheow Khiang v. Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 620 (Sing.); Kok Hoong Tan Dennis
and others v. Public Prosecutor [1996] 3 SLR(R) 570 (Sing.).
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participate in a school ceremony involving the raising of the National Flag
and recitation of the National Pledge.63 Apart from these two lines of cases,
there do not appear to be any overarching themes unifying the increased
numbers of constitutional cases.
The general upturn in the number of constitutional judgments may
also be partly attributable to an increasing awareness of rights and, thus, a
willingness to challenge government policy through the courts. On
September 1, 2000, the Government established Speakers’ Corner at Hong
Lim Park by exempting people wishing to speak at that venue from having
to apply for a license under the Public Entertainments Act.64 During a
parliamentary debate on the subject, Minister for Home Affairs Wong Kan
Seng said that although the Government had not initially favored the idea
due to concerns over the “potential for public disorder in our multi-racial,
multi-religious society,” after further study, it felt that “the risk can be
managed, and the idea is worth trying out, especially in view of the support
it has attracted from civil society groups.”65 He commented, “[I]n the end,
we thought that if that is really what the people want and we can manage the
risk, we will provide for it. Basically, if the people really want this, we will
let them try it out. We hope that they can make it succeed.”66 With effect
from 2008, it became permissible to hold demonstrations at Speakers’
Corner.67 The venue has been used regularly for various events, including
an annual LGBT event called Pink Dot SG68 and a February 2013 protest
against a white paper on population growth69 issued by the Government.70

62

Chan Hiang Leng Colin and others v. Minister for Information and the Arts [1996] 1 SLR(R) 294
(Sing.); Liong Kok Keng v. Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 683 (Sing.).
63
Peter Williams Nappalli v. Institute of Technical Education [1998] SGHC 351 (Sing.); Nappalli
Peter Williams v. Institute of Technical Education [1998] 2 SLR(R) 529 (CA) (Sing.).
64
Public Entertainments Act (Cap 257, 1985 Rev Ed). The exemption was originally effected by the
Public Entertainments (Speakers’ Corner) (Exemption) Order 2000 (G.N. No. S 364/2000), and at present
by the Public Entertainments and Meetings (Speakers’ Corner) (Exemption) (No. 2) Order 2011 (G.N. No.
S 493/2011) and the Public Order (Unrestricted Area) (No. 2) Order 2011 (G.N. No. S 494/2011). For
commentary, see Thio Li-ann, Singapore: Regulating Political Speech and the Commitment ‘to Build a
Democratic Society’, 1(3) INT’L J. CONST. L. 516 (2003).
65
Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (25 April 2000) vol 72 at col 21 (Wong Kan
Seng, Minister for Home Affairs).
66
Id. at col 25.
67
Public Entertainments and Meetings (Speakers’ Corner) (Exemption) Order 2008 (G.N. No. S
426/2008).
68
First held in 2009; see Nur Dianah Suhaimi, 1,000 Turn Up in Pink at Event,
THE STRAITS TIMES (May 17, 2009), http://news.asiaone.com/News/the+Straits+Times/Story/A1Story2009
0517-141933.html; Sharanjit Leyl, Singapore Gays in First Public Rally, BBC NEWS (May 17, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8054402.stm.
69
NATIONAL POPULATION AND TALENT DIVISION, PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE, POPULATION WHITE
PAPER: A SUSTAINABLE POPULATION FOR A DYNAMIC SINGAPORE (2013).
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The 2000s also saw the establishment of civil society organizations,
such as the Humanitarian Organisation for Migration Economics (HOME),
which works to counter human trafficking and labor exploitation, 71 and
MARUAH, a human rights non-governmental organization.72 On October
22, 2007, Nominated Member of Parliament Siew Kum Hong presented a
public petition to Parliament calling for the repeal of section 377A of the
Penal Code.73 This section criminalizes acts of “gross indecency” between
male persons in public or private places. The petition sought to repeal on the
grounds that section 377A violates the guarantee of equality and equal
protection in the Constitution.74 Parliament debated the petition for two
days during the Second Reading of a bill to overhaul the Penal Code, but a
majority of the House ultimately voted to retain the provision in the Code.75
Subsequently, high-profile legal suits challenged the constitutionality of
section 377A.76
Further challenges were also mounted to the Government’s assertion
that it has discretion not to call a by-election to fill a casual vacancy in
Parliament,77 and its grant of a contingent loan of U.S. $4 billion to the
International Monetary Fund without the President’s concurrence.78 It is
submitted that the visibility of such cases, and the increasing opportunities
for Singaporeans to express and share opinions freely at Speakers’ Corner
and on the Internet, emboldens citizens. This, together with greater
participation in activities organized by civil society groups, will cause them
70

4,000 Turn Up at Speakers’ Corner for Population White Paper Protest, YAHOO! NEWS
SINGAPORE (Feb. 16, 2013), http://sg.news.yahoo.com/huge-turnout-at-speakers--corner-for-populationwhite-paper-protest-101051153.html; Goh Chin Lian & Maryam Mokhtar, White Paper Protest Draws Big
Crowd, THE STRAITS TIMES (Feb. 17, 2013), https://sg.news.yahoo.com/huge-turnout-at-speakers--cornerfor-population-white-paper-protest-101051153.html.
71
Registered as a society under the Societies Act (Cap 311, 1985 Rev Ed), on September 6, 2004;
see also Mission & Vision, HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATION FOR MIGRATION ECONOMICS,
http://home.org.sg/mission-vision/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
72
Established in 2007; see Cassandra Chew, Human Rights Group Maruah Gazetted as Political
Body: Decision Means Group Can No Longer Accept Funding from Foreign Sources, THE STRAITS TIMES
(Nov. 12, 2010).
73
Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) s 377A.
74
Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 October 2007) vol 83 at col 2121.
75
Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (22 October 2007) vol 83 at cols 2125ff,
2354ff.
76
Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney-General [2011] 3 SLR 320 (Sing.); Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney-General
[2012] 4 SLR 476 (CA) (Sing.) (standing); Lim Meng Suang v. Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 (Sing.);
Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1059 (Sing.) (substantive issues); Lim Meng Suang v.
Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 (CA) (Sing.).
77
Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 1033 (Sing.) (leave to apply for a
prerogative order); Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 698 (Sing.); Vellama d/o
Marie Muthu v. Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1 (CA) (Sing.) (substantive issues).
78
Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v. Attorney-General [2013] 1 SLR 619 (Sing.); Jeyaretnam Kenneth
Andrew v. Attorney-General [2014] 1 SLR 345 (CA) (Sing.).
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to continue to mature as a society, which may eventually lead to a continued
increase in the number of constitutional cases each year.
2.

Citation of Foreign Precedents

Since the start of constitutional adjudication in 1963, Singaporean
courts have consistently referred to foreign case law. Reference to foreign
precedents might be expected when a novel legal issue arises, or where it is
thought desirable to test the local law against legal developments abroad.79
Predictably, the number of foreign precedents cited tends to track the
number of constitutional judgments delivered by the courts. As Figure 2
below shows, the increase in judgments between 1987 and 1990 was
matched by a corresponding increase in the number of foreign precedents
cited. Thereafter, the number of judgments held more or less steady until
1998, although there were drops in 1991, 1993, and 1997. Subsequently,
there was a decline between 1999 and 2007. The numbers then began to
pick up, reaching much higher levels than before in the years 2008 and
2010–2013, broadly corresponding to the growing quantity of judgments
since 2006.
A selective examination of judgments from different periods suggests
that Singapore courts have, on the whole, viewed foreign precedent with
caution. On some occasions courts applied such precedent, and on others,
courts either distinguished or declined to apply them. It appears that the
courts took the latter route when the precedent did not comport with the
judges’ view of their role in constitutional adjudication.

79
See, e.g., Goh Yihan & Paul Tan, An Empirical Study on the Development of Singapore Law, 23
SING. ACAD. L.J. 176, 194 (2011).
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Figure 2: Number of Foreign Precedents Cited 1963–2013
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1963–1990: Chief Justice Wee Chong Jin

A fairly cautious approach towards the application of foreign
precedent is evident even in the period from 1963 to 1993, the first thirty
years of the bill of rights in Singapore. The courts were receptive to
considering such precedent when related to the constitutional provisions of
other jurisdictions with analogs to the Singapore Constitution; however,
judges remained sensitive to textual differences. Administrative law rules
and matters of constitutional practice such as habeas corpus and
parliamentary procedure, inherited from the British, also provided a basis for
examining and applying Commonwealth precedent.
For instance, in the 1971 judgment Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for
Home Affairs,80 Chief Justice Wee Chong Jin (“Wee C.J.”), sitting as a High
Court judge, considered a U.S. case, Johnson v. Zerbst,81 and an Indian case,
V. Deshpande v. Emperor.82 Wee C.J. reviewed these cases to determine if
an individual detained without trial under the ISA was entitled to be released
if he had been wrongfully denied his right to counsel guaranteed by Article
80
81
82

Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135 (Sing.).
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Vimlabai Deshpande v. King Emperor, 1945 A.I.R. (Bom.) 8 (Ind.).
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5(3) of the Constitution.83 He distinguished Johnson v. Zerbst because the
case stood for the principle that a federal court could only deprive an
accused person of life or liberty if the individual had been accorded a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, unless the right had been waived. If the court
had not complied with this prerequisite, the conviction was void and the
imprisonment unlawful. If a retrial or appeal was no longer possible, the
accused was thus entitled to be released from custody. In contrast, the Chief
Justice held there was an established principle (presumably a common law
one, though he cited no authority) that habeas corpus is not available as a
remedy unless the detainee’s detention is unlawful in some way, and he did
not think it right to depart from that principle. In other words, in Singapore,
an infringement of an accused person’s right to counsel does not
automatically render the detention unlawful.
Turning to Deshpande, Wee C.J. did not find the case useful as the
Indian court provided no justification for ordering the immediate release of
the detainee.84 He went on to find that, despite the applicant’s contentions,
the detention in question was not illegal.
In holding the detention order valid, Wee C.J. cited Karam Singh v.
Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri (Minister of Home Affairs), Malaysia.85
There the Federal Court of Malaya held that the relevant legislation did not
require the order to be in any particular form.86 Karam Singh itself relied on
decisions of the courts of the United Kingdom in R. v. Secretary of State for
Home Affairs, ex parte Lees.87 The Court determined that the order was not
illegal because the grounds and factual allegations on which it was based
were so vague and unintelligible that the detainee was unable to make
adequate representations to the advisory board reviewing the detention.88 In
making this determination, the Chief Justice again distinguished the case
from two judgments of the Supreme Court of India, 89 as the relevant
provisions of the Indian Constitution were different from corresponding
provisions of the Singapore Constitution. He noted that Karam Singh,
referred to above, had reached the same conclusion, 90 and that holding
83

Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 9(3) (originally
enacted as Art 5(3)).
84
Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135 at [18-22] (Sing.).
85
Karam Singh v. Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri [1969] 2 M.L.J. 129 (Fed. Ct.) (Malay.).
86
Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135 at [35] (Sing.).
87
Rex v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs ex parte Lees, [1941] 1 K.B. 72 (Div. Ct.) (CA) (Eng.
& Wales); see Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135 at [36-40] (Sing.).
88
Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135 at [42-53] (Sing.).
89
State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya, 1951 A.I.R. S.C. 157 (India); Dr. Ram Krishan
Bhardwaj v. State of Delhi, 1953 A.I.R. S.C. 318 (India).
90
Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135 at [42-53] (Sing.).
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otherwise would be “wholly inconsistent with the scheme of the Act,” under
which no judicial inquiry into the sufficiency of the grounds for detention
was possible. This was a matter of subjective opinion for the President,
acting upon the Cabinet’s advice.91
Interestingly, the Attorney-General in Lee Mau Seng attempted to
persuade the High Court to adopt what Professor Sujit Choudhry has called a
“genealogical interpretation” of the Constitution—an interpretation based on
the notion that it is acceptable to import and apply doctrines developed from
one constitution to another constitution if the two charters are linked by
relationships of genealogy and history.92 The Attorney-General advocated
that the Court apply a Malaysian Federal Court judgment.93 The High Court
regarded this authority as “unsettled and debatable,”94 and ruled against the
Attorney-General after determining the issue solely by examining the
Singapore Constitution’s provisions.95
Genealogical interpretation has been more readily accepted by courts
in other cases, notably those relating to Article 12(1) of the Constitution,
which states: “All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal
protection of the law.” In Kok Hoong Tan Dennis v. Public Prosecutor,96
the High Court applied a ‘rational relation’ test to Article 12(1), holding that
an impugned legislative provision is constitutional only if it classifies people
according to an intelligible differentia, and the differentia bears a rational
relation to the object of the provision.97 In reaching this decision, the court
applied a Malaysian Federal Court of Criminal Appeal case, which had, in
turn, followed a judgment of the Indian Supreme Court.98
Genealogical interpretations, however, must be applied with
circumspection. It may not be appropriate to assume that simply by
adopting constitutional texts similar to the basic charters of other
jurisdictions, the legislative body intended for all related foreign legal
doctrines to be applied locally as well. The courts of a particular jurisdiction
should always consider if foreign constitutional doctrines are able to shed
91

Id. at [54].
Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 838 (1999); Victor V. Ramraj, Comparative Constitutional
Law in Singapore, 6 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 302, 311-12 (2002); see also Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, Interpreting
Bills of Rights: The Value of a Comparative Approach, 5(1) INT’L J. CONST. L. 122, 129-30 (2007); Lee
Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135 (Sing.)
93
Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Government of Malaysia [1968] 1 M.L.J. 119 (Fed. Ct.) (Malay.).
94
Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs [1971–1973] SLR(R) 135 at [30] (Sing.)
95
Id. at [30-34].
96
Kok Hoong Tan Dennis v. Public Prosecutor, [1996] 3 SLR(R) 570 (Sing.).
97
Id. at [34].
98
Datuk Haji Harun bin Harun Idris v. Public Prosecutor [1977] 2 M.L.J. 155 (Ct. of Crim. App.)
(Malay.) (citing Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar, 1958 A.I.R. S.C. 538 (India)).
92
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light on the provisions of the local bill of rights and contribute positively
towards the development of their meaning.99
In the 1988 case of Times Publishing Bhd v. Sivadas,100 the issue was
whether written submissions to a parliamentary select committee are
absolutely privileged. In response to a notice issued by the Clerk of
Parliament inviting members of the public to make representations on
proposed changes to legislation regulating corporations, the defendant
submitted written representations to the select committee.101 He was not
invited to give oral evidence, but his representations were included in the
committee’s report to Parliament. 102 The plaintiffs felt they had been
libelled by the defendant’s representations, and brought a defamation suit
against him.103 In contrast to Lee Mau Seng, where foreign precedents were
referred to but not found to be of assistance, the High Court in Times
Publishing cited with approval numerous cases from Australia and the
United Kingdom 104 to interpret relevant provisions of the Parliament
(Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act,105 which was enacted pursuant to
Article 63 of the Constitution.106 These cases were pertinent because section
3(1) of the Act states that “[t]he privileges, immunities and powers of
Parliament and of the Speaker, Members and committees of Parliament shall
be the same as those of the Commons House of Parliament of the United
Kingdom and of its Speaker, Members or committees at the establishment of
the Republic of Singapore.” Article 49 of the Australian Constitution107 is
similar.108 The Court found that the defendant’s statements were absolutely
privileged and could not form the basis of civil proceedings against him.109
Later in 1988, the Court of Appeal embraced the approach taken in
Times Publishing in the landmark judgment of Chng Suan Tze.110 Wee C.J.
held that the United Kingdom cases applied in Karam Singh111 could no
longer be regarded as correct, as the law cannot countenance unfettered
executive discretion. In doing so, he relied on decisions of the House of
99

Lee, supra note 92.
Times Publishing Bhd. v. Sivadas [1988] 1 SLR(R) 572 (HC) (Sing.).
101
Id. at 574-75.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Times Publishing Bhd. v. Sivadas [1988] 1 SLR(R) 572 at [576-86] (HC) (Sing.).
105
Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act (Cap 217, 2000 Rev Ed).
106
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 63 (“It shall be lawful
for the Legislature by law to determine and regulate the privileges, immunities or powers of Parliament.”).
107
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 49.
108
Times Publishing Bhd. v. Sivadas [1988] 1 SLR(R) 572 at [581] (HC) (Sing.).
109
Id. at [586–89].
110
Supreme Court Practice Directions, supra note 38.
111
Karam Singh v. Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri [1969] 2 M.L.J. 129 (Fed. Ct.) (Malay.).
100
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Lords and the Privy Council on appeal from Ceylon, Malaysia and the West
Indies Associated States, and from courts in South-West Africa and
Zimbabwe.112 Disapproving of his earlier ruling in Lee Mau Seng, he held
that the authorities’ discretion to detain without trial under the ISA should
henceforth be regarded as objective rather than subjective, and thus open to
judicial review.113
Shortly after the Chng Suan Tze judgment, the Singaporean
Parliament issued a distinct rebuke to the Court by reinstating the law as it
had been laid down in Lee Mau Seng. It inserted section 8B(1) into the ISA,
which reads:
[T]he law governing the judicial review of any decision made
or act done in pursuance of any power conferred upon the
President or the Minister by the provisions of this Act shall be
the same as was applicable and declared in Singapore on the
13th day of July 1971; and no part of the law before, on or after
that date of any other country in the Commonwealth relating to
judicial review shall apply.114
Speaking in Parliament during the Second Reading of the related bill
amending the Constitution, the Minister for Law characterized the approach
of the British courts as “interventionist” and criticized their willingness to
“ignore or disregard the clear intent of the statutory provisions and go
behind the decisions of the Executive.”115 The Minister said that “if we do
not restore the subjective test in Lee Mau Seng, and if we allow foreign case
law and precedents to allow the courts to be involved in an interventionist
role, then we will have an untenable position . . . because our law on national
security matters will be governed by cases decided abroad, in countries
where conditions are totally different from ours.”116
b.

1990–2006: Chief Justice Yong Pung How

Wee C.J. retired at the end of September 1990. During the term of his
successor, Yong Pung How (“Yong C.J.”), the courts increasingly resisted
112

Id.
Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 at [55-85, 139] (Sing.); see also
Lee, Shall the Twain Never Meet?, supra note 60, at 309-10.
114
Internal Security Act (ISA) (Cap 143, 1985 Rev Ed) s 8B(1).
115
Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (25 January 1989) vol 52 at cols 467-68 (S.
Jayakumar, Minister for Law).
116
Id.
113
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applying foreign precedent. Particularly in the second half of Yong C.J.’s
term, the numbers of such judgments cited tended to be comparatively low.
It is tempting to conclude that the courts were simply taking their cue from
the Government’s dim view of the relevance of foreign jurisprudence,117 but
there is no direct evidence of this. However, it is worth noting that up to
1991, the President appointed the Chief Justice and the judges of the
Supreme Court and was obliged to follow the advice of the Prime Minister
on the matter. 118 In 1991, the Constitution was amended to make the
President an office directly elected by the people, and he is now empowered
to act in his personal discretion and disagree with the Prime Minister’s
choice of Supreme Court judges.119 Nonetheless, this has not resulted in any
significant change to the Cabinet’s ability to determine the composition of
the Court. To date, the President has not exercised his veto power. In any
case, if the President were to do so in the future, he would have to consult
the Council of Presidential Advisers first.120 If the President’s refusal to
make an appointment was contrary to the Council’s recommendation,
Parliament could overrule his decision by obtaining at least a two-thirds vote
of all elected Members of Parliament.121 At present, such a vote is not
difficult to achieve, as the ruling People’s Action Party holds 80 out of the
87 elected seats in Parliament. This is not to say that persons nominated by
the Cabinet for appointment as judges would inevitably be biased in favor of
the Government’s views. Chan Sek Keong, Singapore’s third Chief Justice,
has robustly defended judicial independence, writing:
[Independence from the Legislature means] that judges should
not be adjudicating “with parliamentary approval or the
avoidance of parliamentary reprobation in mind.” It also means
that judges should not be concerned about any adverse
criticisms by Members of Parliament on the decisions of the
courts affecting them or their party. Nor should judges be
afraid to strike down Acts of Parliament which are inconsistent
with the constitution . . . . With respect to the Executive, this
117
See, e.g., Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Comparative Law and Constitutional Interpretation in
Singapore: Insights from Constitutional Theory, in EVOLUTION OF A REVOLUTION: FORTY YEARS OF THE
SINGAPORE CONSTITUTION 114, 121 (Li-ann Thio & Kevin Y. L. Tan eds., 2009).
118
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 95(1)-(2) (Before
tendering advice as to the appointment of Supreme Court judges other than the Chief Justice, the Prime
Minister was required to consult the Chief Justice.).
119
Id. at Art 22(1)(a), 95(1).
120
Id. at Art 21(3).
121
Id. at Art 22(2).
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means, for one, that a judge should not tailor judicial decisions
to ingratiate himself or herself with the Executive for whatever
reason, be it for promotion or otherwise. The courts must also
not shy away from exercising their power of judicial review to
correct, and if necessary nullify, any executive act or decision
which is contrary to its statutory powers for fear of executive
reaction.122
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that the Prime Minister would
naturally advise the President to appoint as judges women and men who
generally share the Government’s philosophy towards governance, rather
than people who have publicly evinced an inclination to disagree with its
policies. As this article later addresses, however, this does not explain the
change in judicial approach beginning in 2006.
During the 1990–2006 period, constitutional cases saw a more
skeptical analysis of foreign precedents. In particular, several litigants failed
to convince the courts to adopt theories based on European and U.S. cases.
In the 1992 case Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew, 123 the
appellant, an opposition politician, sought to rely on the common law
defense of qualified privilege when sued for defamation by the then Prime
Minister. 124 The appellant particularly emphasized 125 the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision New York Times v. Sullivan126 and that of the European
Court of Human Rights in Lingens v. Austria.127 He argued that Article
14(1)(a) of the Singaporean Constitution, which guarantees citizens the right
to freedom of speech and expression,128 required the qualified privilege
defense to be modified if the statement relates to the conduct of public
officials, even when the statement is publically made. The Court of Appeal
declined to follow these decisions because “[t]he terms of Art 14 of our
Constitution differ materially from the First and Fourteenth Amendments of
the Constitution of the United States and also from Art 10 of the European
122

Chan Sek Keong, Securing and Maintaining the Independence of the Court in Judicial
Proceedings, 22 SING. ACAD. L.J. 229, 242-43 (2010) (citations omitted).
123
Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew [1992] 1 SLR(R) 791 (CA) (Sing.).
124
Id. at [74-76] (citing Blackshaw v. Lord, [1984] Q.B. 1 (CA) (Eng.)) (Traditionally, a person may
only rely on qualified privilege as a defense to the tort of defamation if (1) he or she is under a legal, moral,
or social duty to make the impugned statement; and (2) it is made to people with a corresponding duty to
receive it. In the absence of such a correspondence of duty, the defense does not apply to statements which
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Convention on Human Rights.”129 The Court of Appeal noted that, unlike
the First Amendment, Article 14 of the Singapore Constitution does not
expressly prohibit the legislature from making laws abridging the freedom of
speech or freedom of the press. The Court of Appeal also noted that Article
10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides that
the exercise of free speech is subject to “restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society . . . for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others,”130 is a phraseology that does
not appear in Article 14 of the Singapore Constitution. Since Article 14(2)(a)
merely states that “Parliament may by law impose . . . restrictions . . . to
provide against . . . defamation,”131 Parliament may freely impose such
restrictions on the right to freedom of speech as it sees fit. Parliament did so
by providing for the continued application of the common law of defamation
in Singapore following the nation’s independence in 1965.132 This approach
has been criticized as excessively literal.133
Despite the Court of Appeal’s decision in Jeyaretnam not to apply
European and U.S. precedents, the Court appeared to act inconsistently in its
adoption and rejection of foreign cases. The Court did not find the New
York Times and Lingens judgments relevant. It did look to three Canadian
cases to buttress its point that public officials are entitled to have their
reputations protected by the law, and that any extension of the qualified
privilege defense was undesirable.134 These cases were delivered before the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms135 came into force;136 the Court
neither explained why it preferred these cases despite the lack of a rightsbased context at the time they were decided, nor considered whether they
would still be regarded by the Canadian courts as persuasive. It could be
said that the Court adopted a “dialogical interpretation” of bills of rights, an
129
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acceptable technique of constitutional adjudication.137 In doing so, judges
merely use foreign precedent “instrumentally, as a means to stimulate
constitutional self-reflection,” 138 and do not make any normative claims
based on foreign precedent.139 However, applying precedent in this manner
can too easily be misconstrued and can come across as cherry-picking if
judges do not provide convincing reasons why they are rejecting modern
lines of authority in favor of seemingly obsolete ones.140
The Privy Council articulated a similar disdain for foreign
jurisprudence in hearing an appeal from Singapore in 1980. In Ong Ah
Chuan v. Public Prosecutor,141 their Lordships were called upon to consider
whether the presumption of innocence is a fundamental human right
protected by Article 9(1) of the Constitution, which states that “[n]o person
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with
law,”142 and Article 12(1). They prefaced their discussion of the issue with
the following statement:
These articles are among eight articles in Pt IV of the
Constitution under the heading “Fundamental Liberties.” The
eight articles are identical with similar provisions in the
Constitution of Malaysia, but differ considerably in their
language from and are much less compendious and detailed
than those to be found in Pt III of the Constitution of India
under the heading “Fundamental Rights.” They differ even
more widely from those amendments to the Constitution of the
United States of America which are often referred to as its Bill
of Rights. In view of these differences their Lordships are of
the opinion that decisions of Indian courts on Pt III of the
Indian Constitution should be approached with caution as
guides to the interpretation of individual articles in Pt IV of the
Singapore Constitution; and that decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States on that country’s Bill of Rights,
whose phraseology is now nearly 200 years old, are of little
help in construing provisions of the Constitution of Singapore

137
138
139
140
141
142

See Choudhry, supra note 92, at 836; Ramraj, supra note 92, at 313-17.
Choudhry, supra note 92, at 892.
Ramraj, supra note 92, at 315-16.
See Lee, supra note 92, at 131-32.
Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor [1979–1980] SLR(R) 710 (PC) (appeal taken from Sing.).
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint) Art 9(1).

276

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 24 NO. 2

or other modern Commonwealth constitutions which follow
broadly the Westminster model.143
Regrettably, the court did not mention the Indian and U.S. decisions
that might have had a bearing on the issue, and thus did not explain why
they were thought to be unhelpful. This approach was abandoned by the
Privy Council 200 decision in Reyes v. The Queen,144 with their Lordships
holding that “limited assistance” was to be gained from Ong Ah Chuan and
another case because the decisions had been “made at a time when
international jurisprudence on human rights was rudimentary and the Board
found little assistance in such authority as there was.”145
The approach taken in Ong Ah Chuan and Jeyaretnam of disdaining
certain lines of foreign jurisprudence was applied again in Chan Hiang Leng
Colin v. Public Prosecutor.146 The issue facing the High Court was whether
administrative orders issued by the Government to deregister the Singapore
Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and ban works by publishing
companies associated with the Jehovah’s Witnesses violated the right to
freedom of religion as guaranteed by Article 15(1) of the Singapore
Constitution.147 To justify not referring to U.S. First Amendment cases
when interpreting Article 15(1), Chief Justice Yong quoted the following
sentence from a 1963 decision of the High Court of Malaya, Government of
the State of Kelantan v. Government of the Federation of Malaya:148 “[T]he
Constitution is primarily to be interpreted within its own four walls and not
in the light of analogies drawn from other countries such as Great Britain,
the United States of America or Australia.”149 Scholars have called this
approach the ‘four walls’ theory or the doctrine of constitutional
adjudication.150 The Chief Justice recognized that the First Amendment
143
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contains both an ‘establishment clause,’ which prohibits Congress from
enacting any law that tends to create a state religion, as well as a ‘free
exercise clause,’ which restricts Congress from interfering with the free
exercise of religion. Curiously, though, he was satisfied that U.S. cases were
inapplicable to Singapore because “the Singapore Constitution does not
prohibit the ‘establishment’ of any religion.”151 However, this was beside
the point because U.S. precedent interpreting the free exercise clause may
have been relevant to Article 15(1), which is directed towards a similar
end.152
Chief Justice Yong also declined to refer to U.S. cases on the ground
that “[t]he social conditions in Singapore are, of course, markedly different
from those in the United States.”153 He said: “On this basis alone, I am not
influenced by the various views as enunciated in the American cases cited to
me but instead must restrict my analysis of the issues here with reference to
the local context.” 154 Unfortunately, he did not articulate what these
markedly different social conditions were, making it hard to assess whether
U.S. cases are indeed inapplicable to Singapore.155
The Kelantan case, which was quoted in Chan Hiang Leng Colin,
relied on the Privy Council’s judgment in Adegbenro v. Akintola 156 to
support the ‘four walls’ proposition. However, a careful reading of
Adegbenro shows that the case merely indicates that foreign legal principles
should not be applied if they cannot be accommodated by the local
constitutional text.157 Their Lordships pointed out that “it may well be
useful on occasions to draw on British practice or doctrine in interpreting a
doubtful phrase whose origin can be traced or to study decisions on the
Constitutions of Australia or the United States where federal issues are
involved”—thus not entirely ruling out the use of foreign precedents.
However, it must be borne in mind that “it is in the end the wording of the
Constitution itself that is to be interpreted and applied, and this wording can
never be overridden by the extraneous principles of other Constitutions
Engagement with International Human Rights Law, 8 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 41, 59 (2004); Li-ann Thio,
supra note 136, at 472-74; Lee, supra note 92, at 124-33.
151
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27 H.K.L.J. 152, 176 (“This perfunctory [waving] away of foreign cases on the basis of ‘we’re different’ is
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which are not explicitly incorporated in the formulae that have been chosen
as the frame of this Constitution.”158
Indeed, the reluctance of the High Court in Chan Hiang Leng Colin to
refer to certain foreign precedents did not mean that it did not cite any. For
instance, in support of its view that the administrative orders did not violate
the Constitution, the Court cited an Australian decision, Adelaide Company
of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. v. The Commonwealth,159 and an Indian one,
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt.160 The Australian decision was relied
upon as an example of a court upholding the lawfulness of a government
declaration that a corporation of Jehovah’s Witnesses was “prejudicial to the
defense of the Commonwealth and the efficient prosecution of war,” and the
consequential seizure of its premises. The Australian court upheld the
government declaration even though section 116 of the Australian
Constitution protected the members’ right to free exercise of their religion
from incursion by the federal government.161 Unfortunately, the Singapore
High Court did not explain why a judgment rendered in the midst of World
War II should be applicable to peacetime Singapore. The Swamiar decision
was cited for Justice Bjan Jumar Mukherjea’s point that “the right of
freedom of religion must be reconciled with ‘the right of the State to employ
the sovereign power to ensure peace, security and orderly living without
which constitutional guarantee of civil liberty would be a mockery.’”162
Assistant Professor Arun Thiruvengadam has noted that this statement was
cited out of context because Justice Bjan Jumar Mukherjea had been
paraphrasing Chief Justice John Latham in Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s
Witnesses. In that case, Chief Justice John Latham had gone on to contrast it
with the more liberal approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in West
Virginia v. Barnette,163 which he ultimately preferred and adopted.164 Again,
it might be said that the High Court made dialogical use of these foreign
precedents, but if so, it did not provide sufficient justifications.
The four walls doctrine went on to be cited in three 1998 judgments—
Taw Cheng Kong v. Public Prosecutor, 165 Peter Williams Nappalli v.
158
159

(Austl.).
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Institute of Technical Education, 166 and the appeal from the latter case,
which was reported as Nappalli Peter Williams v. Institute of Technical
Education.167 The doctrine last appeared in Chee Siok Chin v. Minister for
Home Affairs in December 2005.168 Despite courts’ reliance on the four
walls doctrine, foreign precedents continued to be cited as demonstrated by
the Nappalli cases. This suggests that the courts’ choice of which precedent
to apply was not driven by a desire to engage in a transjudicial dialogue, but
largely by the courts’ perceived need to constrain their own power in order
to maintain a deferential stance towards the executive and legislature.169
c.

2006–Present: Chief Justices Chan Sek Keong and Sundaresh Menon

Singapore’s third Chief Justice, Chan Sek Keong (“Chan C.J.”), took
office in 2006. During his term and the term of his successor, Sundaresh
Menon, the number of foreign precedents referred to in the cases surveyed
rose. This suggests that judges’ ethos towards the use of such precedents in
constitutional adjudication changed. What led to this change is hard to
discern. As mentioned above, from 1991 onward, the Cabinet conferred a
veto power over judicial nominations to the President. However, since 1991,
no President has exercised the veto. This means that the Cabinet had a free
hand in nominating judicial candidates that share its mindset on governance.
Accordingly, the change in attitude regarding the usage of foreign
precendents may simply reflect a change in the temperaments of the
individual judges.
This change is illustrated by comparing the 2006 High Court
judgment in Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party,170 and the
2010 Court of Appeal judgment in Review Publishing Co Ltd v. Lee Hsien
Loong. 171 In both decisions, the plaintiffs were Lee Hsien Loong, the
current Prime Minister of Singapore, and his father Lee Kuan Yew, the
former Prime Minister of Singapore, respectively. They sued for defamation.
In response, the defendants argued, among other things, that Article 14(1)(a)
of the Constitution required the courts to modify the defense of qualified
166
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privilege along the lines of Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd, a United
Kingdom decision.172 In that case, the House of Lords held that publishers
have a good defense to libel if they have practiced “responsible
journalism.”173 In Lee Hsien Loong, the High Court held that the House of
Lords in Reynolds modified the common law of defamation in light of
Article 10 of the European Convention, which was to have binding effect in
the United Kingdom when the Human Rights Act 1998174 came into force.
Thus, the Court held that since the phrasing of Article 10 of the Human
Rights Act differed from that of Article 14 of Singapore’s Constitution,
Reynolds should not be followed.175 The High Court essentially adopted the
approach taken in Jeyaretnam, which was binding on it.
The Court also considered the Australian decision Lange v. Australian
Broadcasting Corporation, 176 and the New Zealand decision Lange v.
Atkinson,177 both of which held that a defense of privilege to defamation
applies to statements containing information on political and government
matters.178 However, the Court declined to adopt this principle because both
decisions were “decisions born of the constitutional, political and social
contexts in Australia and New Zealand.”179 Without providing details as to
why these contexts were different in Singapore, the Court reiterated the
stand taken in Jeyaretnam that the reputations of public figures should be
protected to the same extent as those of ordinary people.180
In Review Publishing, the Court of Appeal departed from cases like
Chan Hiang Leng Colin and Lee Hsien Loong, where assertions that
conditions in Singapore are different from those in other countries were
made but not fully justified. Chan C.J., who penned the Court’s opinion,
stated that the defendants were not entitled to rely on Article 14 because they
were not Singaporean citizens.181 Nonetheless, he proceeded to discuss on
an obiter basis whether citizens could rely on the Reynolds defense. He did
not provide a definitive answer, but said that the courts would need to make
172
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a value judgment when striking a balance between freedom of expression
and the protection of reputation, and this would depend on “local political
and social conditions.”182 His Honor then examined some considerations
bearing upon these local conditions, including the fact that “there is no room
in our political context for the media to engage in investigative journalism
which carries with it a political agenda,” and that “[o]ur local political
culture places a heavy emphasis on honesty and integrity in public discourse
on matters of public interest, especially those matters which concern the
governance of this country.” 183 Chan C.J.’s discussion of these
considerations may be critiqued on the ground that it relied too heavily on
past court cases and statements by government ministers, and did not
account for the views of civil society groups and opposition politicians.
Even so, the endeavor to provide principled reasons distinguishes this case
from earlier ones. Chan C.J. concluded by commenting that if the courts did
find that citizens were entitled to avail themselves of the Reynolds defense, it
would be necessary to consider how the “new balance” between free speech
and protection of reputation should be struck, and, “[i]n this regard, it
would . . . be helpful for our courts to bear in mind the different approaches
which other common law jurisdictions have taken in order to give freedom
of speech precedence over protection of reputation.”184
In the 2008 judgment of Tan Chor Jin v. Public Prosecutor,185 the
Court of Appeal considered whether the appellant, who had been convicted
by the High Court of shooting and killing a man, had been deprived of his
right to counsel because the trial judge had denied him permission to speak
with a lawyer just before closing submissions were to be made. Prior to the
start of the trial, and again on the first day of the hearing, the appellant
confirmed that he wished to represent himself. The Court embarked on an
extensive review of cases from Canada, Malaysia, and the United States, as
well as Privy Council judgments on appeal from Jamaica.186 The Court
eventually concluded that the common thread in these cases was the need to
ensure fairness to the accused.187 It declined “[f]or now” to adopt the U.S.
approach of laying down a detailed test as to when someone might waive his
or her right to counsel, instead holding that courts should consider whether
182
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the lack of legal representation led to unfairness or prejudice to the
accused.188 It then found that, on the facts, the appellant had not been
prejudiced.
References to foreign precedents also proved helpful in the Court of
Appeal judgments Yong Vui Kong v. Attorney-General189 and Ramalingam
Ravinthran v. Attorney-General,190 delivered in 2011 and 2012, respectively,
by Chan C.J. and Judges of Appeal Andrew Phang and V.K. Rajah. In Yong
Vui Kong v. A.G., the issue was the justiciability of the power to grant
clemency, which is conferred on the President by Article 22P of the
Constitution and exercisable upon the Cabinet’s advice. In a separate
opinion, Chan C.J. examined cases from Australia, Canada, the Caribbean
States, England, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, and New Zealand. He
preferred the line of authorities indicating that the clemency power is subject
to judicial review if it is alleged to have been exercised in bad faith or
unconstitutionally.191 In Ramalingam, Chan C.J. held that the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion is judicially reviewable on the same grounds. In the
course of his judgment on behalf of the Court, he referred to a Privy Council
decision on appeal from Malaysia,192 as well as decisions of U.S. federal
courts, to support the conclusion that a presumption of constitutionality or
legality applies to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.193
One common feature of Tan Chor Jin, Yong Vui Kong v. A.G., and
Ramalingam is that the relevant provisions of the Constitution requiring
interpretation were not that different from analogous provisions in foreign
jurisdictions. For instance, the constitutional issue in Tan Chor Jin related
to Article 9(3), the relevant parts of which state: “Where a person is arrested,
he . . . shall be allowed to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of
his choice.”194 The Court of Appeal looked at cases from Malaysia, Canada,
and Jamaica, among other jurisdictions. Article 5(3) of the Malaysian
Constitution is identical to Singapore’s Article 9(3), since the latter was
imported from the former.195 Section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter states:
“Everyone has the right on arrest or detention . . . to retain and instruct
counsel without delay and to be informed of that right,”196 while section
188
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20(6)(c) of the Constitution of Jamaica 1962 provides: “Every person who is
charged with a criminal offence . . . shall be permitted to defend himself in
person or by a legal representative of his own choice.”197 Thus, similarities
between constitutional provisions in Singapore and in other jurisdictions
likely gave the Court of Appeal confidence to apply precedents from these
jurisdictions.
On the other hand, the courts remain cautious about applying foreign
precedents decided on the basis of differently worded bills of rights. In
Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor,198 a 2010 decision by Chan C.J. and
Judges of Appeal Phang and Rajah, the Court of Appeal considered
judgments of the Privy Council primarily from the Caribbean States, as well
as judgments from India, Malawi, Uganda, and the United States. 199
However, it found these judgments inapplicable in determining whether
Article 9(1) of the Singapore Constitution prohibits inhuman punishment, as
all except the Indian judgment were based on bills of rights that contain
specific prohibitions against inhuman punishment, whereas Article 9(1) does
not.200 The Court took the view that Article 9(1) could not be read to contain
such a prohibition by implication. It held this because, while a 1966
constitutional commission proposed that a specific proscription against
torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment be inserted into
the Constitution, this suggestion, though accepted in principle by the
Government, was ultimately not acted upon.201 As for the Indian case,
Mithu v. State of Punjab,202 the Court of Appeal declined to follow it on
three grounds despite the fact that the Indian Constitution, like the Singapore
one, does not expressly outlaw inhuman punishment. First, the Supreme
Court of India applied a test of fairness, justice, and reasonableness, which
the Singapore Court found too vague, and which “requires the court to
intrude into the legislative sphere of Parliament as well as engage in policy
making.”203 Secondly, the decision implied that all legislatively prescribed
mandatory sentences and all fixed minimum and maximum sentences are
197
198
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unconstitutional; although that “may be . . . the law in India . . . . it is not the
law in Singapore.”204 Finally, the Court held that “[t]he decision in Mithu is
entirely understandable, having regard to the economic, social and political
conditions prevailing in India and the pro-active approach of the Indian
Supreme Court in matters relating to the social and economic conditions of
the people of India,”205 thus suggesting that different conditions existed in
Singapore, and that the courts should not adopt an activist stance when
interpreting the Constitution.
II.

ANALSYSIS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The selected Supreme Court judgments above highlight the fact that
Singapore courts have consistently referred to foreign precedents in
constitutional adjudication over the past half-century. This was true even
during the period roughly corresponding with Chief Justice Yong Pung
How’s term of office (1990–2006), when the four walls doctrine held sway,
although there was a fall in the number of such precedents cited. The last
explicit mention of the doctrine was in 2005; since then, “it appears that the
‘four walls’ doctrine has quietly fallen out of fashion at least in practice, as
courts now regularly consider foreign cases which have only persuasive, not
precedential value . . . . It is fair to say that the development of Singapore
public law is not accomplished in a cloister sealed off from transnational
models, but through a thoughtful engagement with foreign cases.”206
However, the mere references to foreign precedents do not mean that
the courts have consistently engaged in a transjudicial dialogue with their
counterparts abroad. Rather, it appears that judges have been willing to
apply foreign precedents only where the wording of the Constitution and the
constitutional arrangements in Singapore are fairly analogous to the
constitutional texts and arrangements upon which the precedents were
decided. Judgments illustrating this include Kok Hoong Tan Dennis,
Sivadas, Chng Suan Tze, Tan Chor Jin, Yong Vui Kong v. A.G., and
Ramalingam. Some cases such as Jeyaretnam and Chan Hiang Leng Colin
also demonstrate the courts’ tendency to approvingly quote passages from
foreign cases to support statements of law without necessarily analyzing in
detail the reasoning underlying such cases. What judges have not been
204
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willing to do, however, is to use comparative constitutional material as a
springboard to develop Singapore’s constitutional law in a manner
incongruent with what they perceive to be the court’s role in judicial
review.207
Arun Thiruvengadam has theorized that Singaporean judges tend
strongly towards the National Formalism rather than the Cosmopolitan
Pragmatism model of constitutionalism.208 National Formalist judges are
skeptical about the applicability of foreign precedents because they see the
constitution as “deeply rooted in its particular history and political traditions,”
and are more deferential to the policy choices of the executive and
legislature.209 In contrast, Cosmopolitan Pragmatist judges see constitutions
as “normative attempts to embody notions of fundamental justice,” and
regard it as their responsibility to keep the constitution in line with modern
societal values. They view foreign precedents favorably because they regard
certain constitutional norms as transcending jurisdictional boundaries, and
thus it is useful to see what solutions foreign courts have developed to deal
with common problems.210
Some of the cases examined in the previous section bear out this
analysis. Jeyaretnam, Lee Hsien Loong, and Yong Vui Kong v. P.P. are
examples of judgments in which the courts adopted quite literal readings of
constitutional provisions. It will be recalled that in Jeyaretnam, the High
Court held that since Article 14(2)(a) does not require restrictions on
freedom of speech to be “necessary in a democratic society,” Parliament is
free to impose whatever restrictions it sees fit.211 Therefore, cases based on
Article 10 of the European Convention,212 which does contain the phrase
quoted above, are inapplicable in Singapore. Similarly, in Yong Vui Kong v.
P.P., the Court found foreign precedents based on bills of rights that contain
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an express prohibition against inhuman punishment irrelevant when
interpreting Article 9(1) of the Constitution.213
The high degree of deference shown by the Singapore courts to the
political branches of government is borne out by other cases indicating that
legislation and executive acts must be presumed constitutional, and that the
burden of establishing otherwise lies on the applicants making such
claims.214 Furthermore, the courts have demonstrated a reluctance to apply
legal rules requiring them to assess the reasonableness of legislative or
executive policy. We have already seen the Court of Appeal’s refusal in
Yong Vui Kong v. P.P. to adopt a test of “fairness, justice and reasonableness”
to Article 9(1) of the Constitution on the ground that it is too vague and
would intrude into the legislative sphere—one of the reasons why it did not
apply a decision of the Indian Supreme Court.215 Reference may also be
made to the High Court’s obiter opinion in Chee Siok Chin that a
proportionality analysis should not be applied when determining if executive
action had infringed the applicant’s rights. The Court said this was because
proportionality is a European legal concept imported into U.K. law due to
the latter’s treaty obligations, and because it “requires, in some cases, the
court to substitute its own judgment for that of the proper authority.
Needless to say, the notion of proportionality has never been part of the
common law in relation to the judicial review of the exercise of a legislative
and/or an administrative power or discretion. Nor has it ever been part of
Singapore law.”216
As Singaporean society matures and people become more accustomed
to speaking in terms of rights and are willing to vindicate them through the
courts, the number of constitutional cases heard by the courts each year is
likely to increase, with a corresponding growth in the citation of foreign
precedents. It is harder, though, to predict whether the scope of transjudicial
dialogue will broaden, or whether the courts will continue to demonstrate
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what Thio Li-ann and David Chong have called “particularism without
parochialism.”217
The signs are mixed. On the one hand, the courts have continued to
adopt a deferential posture towards the executive and legislature. In a
remarkably philosophical judgment rendered in 2013, entitled Jeyaretnam
Kenneth Andrew v. Attorney-General,218 the Court of Appeal expressed a
preference for a ‘green-light’ view of public law. It said:
The recognition that members of the public do not have the
right per se to call upon the courts to review every decision
made by public bodies is not only undergirded by the obvious
pragmatism of minimizing disruptiveness caused by vexatious
claims to the functioning of those bodies, but also exists as a
reflection of the very ethos of our adversarial system . . . . [T]he
courts [are] concerned only with the individual’s rights and
interests, and not matters of public policy, which rightfully
remains in the remit of proper political process. In this vein,
judicial review finds its place as an avenue for parties to bring
claims of legality to the courts, and not for the purposes of
challenging the very merits of a policy decision. Extensive
judicial intervention in the administrative process is by no
means the only avenue by which good governance can be
ensured. Some regulatory functions can be better performed by
other institutions or organs of state.219
Accordingly, the Court held that the applicant lacked standing to bring
judicial review proceedings against the Government for offering a
contingent loan of US $4 billion to the International Monetary Fund without
the President’s concurrence, which the applicant alleged to be a breach of
the Constitution.220 The applicant could not show that the executive act had
breached any private right which he enjoyed, or breached a public right
which had led to him suffering special damage.221
On the other hand, the Court indicated that where “extremely
exceptional instances of very grave and serious breaches of legality”
appeared to have taken place, “such that it would be in the public interest for
the courts to hear the case, an applicant sans rights may be accorded locus
217
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standi as well, at the discretion of the courts.”222 Similarly, in Yong Vui
Kong v. P.P.,223 the Court of Appeal shed its diffidence towards implying
into the constitutional text principles that were not explicitly set out. It held
on an obiter basis that legislation intended to usurp the courts’ role by
securing the conviction of particular known individuals, and “legislation of
so absurd or arbitrary a nature that it could not possibly have been
contemplated by our constitutional framers as being ‘law’ when they crafted
the constitutional provisions protecting fundamental liberties,” might not
qualify as ‘law’ within the meaning of Article 9(1) of the Constitution.224
Ultimately, while there is little doubt that the Singapore courts will
continue to cite foreign precedents when interpreting the Constitution, the
choice of which precedents to follow or reject will depend on whether they
remain largely deferential to the policy choices of the political branches, or
instead develop constitutional principles to subject these choices to greater
scrutiny. It will be interesting to see which direction Chief Justice
Sundaresh Menon, who assumed office in 2012, will steer the courts.
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